A House Monotone, Coherent, and Droop Proportional Ranked Candidate Voting Method
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arXiv
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866911585475231744 |
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| author | Hyman, Ross |
| author_facet | Hyman, Ross |
| contents | A Ranked candidate voting method based on Phragmen's procedure is described that can be used to produce a top-down proportional candidate list. The method complies with the Droop proportionality criterion satisfied by Single Transferable Vote. It also complies with house monotonicity and coherence, which are the ranked-candidate analogs of the divisor methods properties of always avoiding the Alabama and New State paradoxes. The highest ranked candidate in the list is the Instant Runoff winner, which is in at least one Droop proportional set of N winners for all N. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_12318 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A House Monotone, Coherent, and Droop Proportional Ranked Candidate Voting Method Hyman, Ross Theoretical Economics A Ranked candidate voting method based on Phragmen's procedure is described that can be used to produce a top-down proportional candidate list. The method complies with the Droop proportionality criterion satisfied by Single Transferable Vote. It also complies with house monotonicity and coherence, which are the ranked-candidate analogs of the divisor methods properties of always avoiding the Alabama and New State paradoxes. The highest ranked candidate in the list is the Instant Runoff winner, which is in at least one Droop proportional set of N winners for all N. |
| title | A House Monotone, Coherent, and Droop Proportional Ranked Candidate Voting Method |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.12318 |