Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.12416 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866918059018551296 |
|---|---|
| author | Cavounidis, Costas Furlan, Massimiliano Georgiadis-Harris, Alkis |
| author_facet | Cavounidis, Costas Furlan, Massimiliano Georgiadis-Harris, Alkis |
| contents | Alice wishes to reveal the state $X$ to Bob, if he knows some other information $Y$ also known to her. If Bob does not, she wishes to reveal nothing about $X$ at all. When can Alice accomplish this? We provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition on the joint distribution of $X$ and $Y$. Shannon's result on the perfect secrecy of the one-time pad follows as a special case. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_12416 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Perfect Secrecy in the Wild: A Characterization Cavounidis, Costas Furlan, Massimiliano Georgiadis-Harris, Alkis Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory Information Theory Alice wishes to reveal the state $X$ to Bob, if he knows some other information $Y$ also known to her. If Bob does not, she wishes to reveal nothing about $X$ at all. When can Alice accomplish this? We provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition on the joint distribution of $X$ and $Y$. Shannon's result on the perfect secrecy of the one-time pad follows as a special case. |
| title | Perfect Secrecy in the Wild: A Characterization |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory Information Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.12416 |