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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.12604 |
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| _version_ | 1866913893948850176 |
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| author | Bar-Isaac, Heski Deb, Rahul Mitchell, Matthew |
| author_facet | Bar-Isaac, Heski Deb, Rahul Mitchell, Matthew |
| contents | We introduce a model of content moderation for sale, where a platform can channel attention in two ways: direct steering that makes content visible to consumers and certification that controls what consumers know about the content. The platform optimally price discriminates using both instruments. Content from higher willingness-to-pay providers enjoys higher quality certification and more views. The platform cross-subsidizes content: the same certificate is assigned to content from low willingness-to-pay providers that appeals to consumers and content from higher willingness-to-pay providers that does not. Cross-subsidization can benefit consumers by making content more diverse; regulation enforcing accurate certification may be harmful. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_12604 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Selling Certification, Content Moderation, and Attention Bar-Isaac, Heski Deb, Rahul Mitchell, Matthew Theoretical Economics We introduce a model of content moderation for sale, where a platform can channel attention in two ways: direct steering that makes content visible to consumers and certification that controls what consumers know about the content. The platform optimally price discriminates using both instruments. Content from higher willingness-to-pay providers enjoys higher quality certification and more views. The platform cross-subsidizes content: the same certificate is assigned to content from low willingness-to-pay providers that appeals to consumers and content from higher willingness-to-pay providers that does not. Cross-subsidization can benefit consumers by making content more diverse; regulation enforcing accurate certification may be harmful. |
| title | Selling Certification, Content Moderation, and Attention |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.12604 |