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Selling Certification, Content Moderation, and Attention

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Bar-Isaac, Heski, Deb, Rahul, Mitchell, Matthew
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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