Upstream competition and exclusive content provision in media markets

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Author: Yoon, Kiho
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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_version_ 1866918309591515136
author Yoon, Kiho
author_facet Yoon, Kiho
contents With a multilateral vertical contracting model of media markets, we examine upstream competition and contractual arrangements in content provision. We analyze the trade of content by the Nash bargaining solution and the downstream competition by the Hotelling location model. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes and the contractual arrangements for various vertical structures. We show that the possibility of exclusive contracts rises when the value of the premium content increases, the degree of horizontal differentiation in the downstream market decreases, the importance of advertising revenue decreases, and the relative bargaining power of upstream firm decreases.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_15063
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Upstream competition and exclusive content provision in media markets
Yoon, Kiho
Theoretical Economics
With a multilateral vertical contracting model of media markets, we examine upstream competition and contractual arrangements in content provision. We analyze the trade of content by the Nash bargaining solution and the downstream competition by the Hotelling location model. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes and the contractual arrangements for various vertical structures. We show that the possibility of exclusive contracts rises when the value of the premium content increases, the degree of horizontal differentiation in the downstream market decreases, the importance of advertising revenue decreases, and the relative bargaining power of upstream firm decreases.
title Upstream competition and exclusive content provision in media markets
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15063