Binary Self-Selective Voting Rules
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866916918928080896 |
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| author | Hermida-Rivera, Héctor Kerman, Toygar T. |
| author_facet | Hermida-Rivera, Héctor Kerman, Toygar T. |
| contents | This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In Theorem 1, we show that a neutral voting rule is binary self-selective if and only if it is universally self-selective. We then use this equivalence to show, in Corollary 1, that under the unrestricted strict preference domain, a unanimous and neutral voting rule is binary self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. In Theorem 2 and Corollary 2, we show that whenever there is a strong Condorcet winner; a unanimous, neutral and anonymous voting rule is binary self-selective (or universally self-selective) if and only if it is the Condorcet voting rule. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_15265 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Binary Self-Selective Voting Rules Hermida-Rivera, Héctor Kerman, Toygar T. Theoretical Economics This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In Theorem 1, we show that a neutral voting rule is binary self-selective if and only if it is universally self-selective. We then use this equivalence to show, in Corollary 1, that under the unrestricted strict preference domain, a unanimous and neutral voting rule is binary self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. In Theorem 2 and Corollary 2, we show that whenever there is a strong Condorcet winner; a unanimous, neutral and anonymous voting rule is binary self-selective (or universally self-selective) if and only if it is the Condorcet voting rule. |
| title | Binary Self-Selective Voting Rules |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15265 |