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A theory of Lending Protocols in DeFi

Fuente: arXiv

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Dettagli Bibliografici
Autori principali:	Bartoletti, Massimo, Lipparini, Enrico
Natura:	Preprint
Pubblicazione:	2025
Soggetti:	Computer Science and Game Theory Cryptography and Security Logic in Computer Science
Accesso online:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Aggiungi Tag Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!

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