Minimal Stable Voting Rules
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866908499848462336 |
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| author | Hermida-Rivera, Héctor |
| author_facet | Hermida-Rivera, Héctor |
| contents | In this paper, I characterize minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions (i.e., pairs of voting rules) for societies in which only power matters. To do so, I first let players' preference profiles over voting rules satisfy four natural axioms commonly used in the analysis of power: non-dominance, anonymity, null player and swing player. I then provide simple notions of minimal stability and minimal self-stability, and show that the families of minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions are fairly small. Finally, I conclude that political parties have evolved to ensure the minimal self-stability of otherwise not minimal self-stable constitutions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_15323 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Minimal Stable Voting Rules Hermida-Rivera, Héctor Theoretical Economics In this paper, I characterize minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions (i.e., pairs of voting rules) for societies in which only power matters. To do so, I first let players' preference profiles over voting rules satisfy four natural axioms commonly used in the analysis of power: non-dominance, anonymity, null player and swing player. I then provide simple notions of minimal stability and minimal self-stability, and show that the families of minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions are fairly small. Finally, I conclude that political parties have evolved to ensure the minimal self-stability of otherwise not minimal self-stable constitutions. |
| title | Minimal Stable Voting Rules |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15323 |