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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15624 |
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| _version_ | 1866908412850208768 |
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| author | Goodyear, Lyle Guo, Rachel Johari, Ramesh |
| author_facet | Goodyear, Lyle Guo, Rachel Johari, Ramesh |
| contents | Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise as decision-makers in dynamic settings, but their stateless nature necessitates creating a natural language representation of history. We present a unifying framework for systematically constructing natural language "state" representations for prompting LLM agents in repeated multi-agent games. Previous work on games with LLM agents has taken an ad hoc approach to encoding game history, which not only obscures the impact of state representation on agents' behavior, but also limits comparability between studies. Our framework addresses these gaps by characterizing methods of state representation along three axes: action informativeness (i.e., the extent to which the state representation captures actions played); reward informativeness (i.e., the extent to which the state representation describes rewards obtained); and prompting style (or natural language compression, i.e., the extent to which the full text history is summarized).
We apply this framework to a dynamic selfish routing game, chosen because it admits a simple equilibrium both in theory and in human subject experiments \cite{rapoport_choice_2009}. Despite the game's relative simplicity, we find that there are key dependencies of LLM agent behavior on the natural language state representation. In particular, we observe that representations which provide agents with (1) summarized, rather than complete, natural language representations of past history; (2) information about regrets, rather than raw payoffs; and (3) limited information about others' actions lead to behavior that more closely matches game theoretic equilibrium predictions, and with more stable game play by the agents. By contrast, other representations can exhibit either large deviations from equilibrium, higher variation in dynamic game play over time, or both. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_15624 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Effect of State Representation on LLM Agent Behavior in Dynamic Routing Games Goodyear, Lyle Guo, Rachel Johari, Ramesh Artificial Intelligence I.2.11; I.6.4; F.1.2; F.2.2; G.3; J.7 Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise as decision-makers in dynamic settings, but their stateless nature necessitates creating a natural language representation of history. We present a unifying framework for systematically constructing natural language "state" representations for prompting LLM agents in repeated multi-agent games. Previous work on games with LLM agents has taken an ad hoc approach to encoding game history, which not only obscures the impact of state representation on agents' behavior, but also limits comparability between studies. Our framework addresses these gaps by characterizing methods of state representation along three axes: action informativeness (i.e., the extent to which the state representation captures actions played); reward informativeness (i.e., the extent to which the state representation describes rewards obtained); and prompting style (or natural language compression, i.e., the extent to which the full text history is summarized). We apply this framework to a dynamic selfish routing game, chosen because it admits a simple equilibrium both in theory and in human subject experiments \cite{rapoport_choice_2009}. Despite the game's relative simplicity, we find that there are key dependencies of LLM agent behavior on the natural language state representation. In particular, we observe that representations which provide agents with (1) summarized, rather than complete, natural language representations of past history; (2) information about regrets, rather than raw payoffs; and (3) limited information about others' actions lead to behavior that more closely matches game theoretic equilibrium predictions, and with more stable game play by the agents. By contrast, other representations can exhibit either large deviations from equilibrium, higher variation in dynamic game play over time, or both. |
| title | The Effect of State Representation on LLM Agent Behavior in Dynamic Routing Games |
| topic | Artificial Intelligence I.2.11; I.6.4; F.1.2; F.2.2; G.3; J.7 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15624 |