Long Coalition Leads to Shrink? The Roles of Tipping and Technology-Sharing in Climate Clubs
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866912440236638208 |
|---|---|
| author | Zhu, Lei Yan, Zhihao Duan, Hongbo Cai, Yongyang Zhang, Xiaobing |
| author_facet | Zhu, Lei Yan, Zhihao Duan, Hongbo Cai, Yongyang Zhang, Xiaobing |
| contents | Global cooperation is posited as a pivotal solution to address climate change, yet significant barriers, like free-riding, hinder its realization. This paper develops a dynamic game-theoretic model to analyze the stability of coalitions under multiple stochastic climate tippings, and a technology-sharing mechanism is designed in the model to combat free-ridings. Our results reveal that coalitions tend to shrink over time as temperatures rise, owing to potential free-ridings, despite a large size of initial coalition. The threat of climate tipping reduces the size of stable coalitions compared to the case where tipping is ignored. However, at post-tipping period, coalitions temporarily expand as regions respond to the shock, though this cooperation is short-lived and followed by further shrink. Notably, technology-sharing generates greater collective benefits than sanctions, suggesting that the proposed dynamic technology-sharing pathway bolsters coalition resilience against free-riding while limiting the global warming. This framework highlights the critical role of technology-sharing in fostering long-term climate cooperation under climate tipping uncertainties. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_16162 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Long Coalition Leads to Shrink? The Roles of Tipping and Technology-Sharing in Climate Clubs Zhu, Lei Yan, Zhihao Duan, Hongbo Cai, Yongyang Zhang, Xiaobing General Economics Economics Global cooperation is posited as a pivotal solution to address climate change, yet significant barriers, like free-riding, hinder its realization. This paper develops a dynamic game-theoretic model to analyze the stability of coalitions under multiple stochastic climate tippings, and a technology-sharing mechanism is designed in the model to combat free-ridings. Our results reveal that coalitions tend to shrink over time as temperatures rise, owing to potential free-ridings, despite a large size of initial coalition. The threat of climate tipping reduces the size of stable coalitions compared to the case where tipping is ignored. However, at post-tipping period, coalitions temporarily expand as regions respond to the shock, though this cooperation is short-lived and followed by further shrink. Notably, technology-sharing generates greater collective benefits than sanctions, suggesting that the proposed dynamic technology-sharing pathway bolsters coalition resilience against free-riding while limiting the global warming. This framework highlights the critical role of technology-sharing in fostering long-term climate cooperation under climate tipping uncertainties. |
| title | Long Coalition Leads to Shrink? The Roles of Tipping and Technology-Sharing in Climate Clubs |
| topic | General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.16162 |