Can structural correspondences ground real world representational content in Large Language Models?
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866912981827190784 |
|---|---|
| author | Williams, Iwan |
| author_facet | Williams, Iwan |
| contents | Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 produce compelling responses to a wide range of prompts. But their representational capacities are uncertain. Many LLMs have no direct contact with extra-linguistic reality: their inputs, outputs and training data consist solely of text, raising the questions (1) can LLMs represent anything and (2) if so, what? In this paper, I explore what it would take to answer these questions according to a structural-correspondence based account of representation, and make an initial survey of this evidence. I argue that the mere existence of structural correspondences between LLMs and worldly entities is insufficient to ground representation of those entities. However, if these structural correspondences play an appropriate role - they are exploited in a way that explains successful task performance - then they could ground real world contents. This requires overcoming a challenge: the text-boundedness of LLMs appears, on the face of it, to prevent them engaging in the right sorts of tasks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_16370 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Can structural correspondences ground real world representational content in Large Language Models? Williams, Iwan Computation and Language Artificial Intelligence Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 produce compelling responses to a wide range of prompts. But their representational capacities are uncertain. Many LLMs have no direct contact with extra-linguistic reality: their inputs, outputs and training data consist solely of text, raising the questions (1) can LLMs represent anything and (2) if so, what? In this paper, I explore what it would take to answer these questions according to a structural-correspondence based account of representation, and make an initial survey of this evidence. I argue that the mere existence of structural correspondences between LLMs and worldly entities is insufficient to ground representation of those entities. However, if these structural correspondences play an appropriate role - they are exploited in a way that explains successful task performance - then they could ground real world contents. This requires overcoming a challenge: the text-boundedness of LLMs appears, on the face of it, to prevent them engaging in the right sorts of tasks. |
| title | Can structural correspondences ground real world representational content in Large Language Models? |
| topic | Computation and Language Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.16370 |