Bidder Feedback in First-Price Auctions for Video Advertising
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866916803077210112 |
|---|---|
| author | Lahaie, Sébastien Schaeffer, Benjamin Zhou, Yuanjun |
| author_facet | Lahaie, Sébastien Schaeffer, Benjamin Zhou, Yuanjun |
| contents | In first-price auctions for display advertising, exchanges typically communicate the "minimum-bid-to-win" to bidders after the auction as feedback for their bidding algorithms. For a winner, this is the second-highest bid, while for losing bidders it is the highest bid. In this paper we investigate the generalization of this concept to general combinatorial auctions, motivated by the domain of video advertising. In a video pod auction, ad slots during an advertising break in a video stream are auctioned all at once, under several kinds of allocation constraints such as a constraint on total ad duration. We cast the problem in terms of computing bid updates (discounts and raises) that maintain the optimality of the current allocation. Our main result characterizes the set of joint bid updates with this property as the core of an associated bicooperative game. In the case of the assignment problem--a special case of video pod auctions--we provide a linear programming characterization of this bicooperative core. Our characterization leads to several candidates for a generalized minimum-bid-to-win. Drawing on video pod auction data from a real ad exchange, we perform an empirical analysis to understand the bidding dynamics they induce and their convergence properties. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_17058 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Bidder Feedback in First-Price Auctions for Video Advertising Lahaie, Sébastien Schaeffer, Benjamin Zhou, Yuanjun Computer Science and Game Theory In first-price auctions for display advertising, exchanges typically communicate the "minimum-bid-to-win" to bidders after the auction as feedback for their bidding algorithms. For a winner, this is the second-highest bid, while for losing bidders it is the highest bid. In this paper we investigate the generalization of this concept to general combinatorial auctions, motivated by the domain of video advertising. In a video pod auction, ad slots during an advertising break in a video stream are auctioned all at once, under several kinds of allocation constraints such as a constraint on total ad duration. We cast the problem in terms of computing bid updates (discounts and raises) that maintain the optimality of the current allocation. Our main result characterizes the set of joint bid updates with this property as the core of an associated bicooperative game. In the case of the assignment problem--a special case of video pod auctions--we provide a linear programming characterization of this bicooperative core. Our characterization leads to several candidates for a generalized minimum-bid-to-win. Drawing on video pod auction data from a real ad exchange, we perform an empirical analysis to understand the bidding dynamics they induce and their convergence properties. |
| title | Bidder Feedback in First-Price Auctions for Video Advertising |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.17058 |