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Autor principal: Murayama, Kota
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2025
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Acceso en línea:https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.17660
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author Murayama, Kota
author_facet Murayama, Kota
contents Does greater connectivity enhance the value of public information? I study a networked beauty contest game where agents balance adaptation to the fundamental with local coordination. The analysis reveals a stark non-monotonicity: while public disclosure improves welfare when interactions are uniform, regardless of their intensity, it can be detrimental in core-periphery structures. This welfare loss stems from a distortion driven by the core, where core agents over-respond to a noisy public signal, forcing peripheral neighbors to absorb this volatility to maintain alignment. These findings suggest that standard transparency policies can backfire in tiered markets where dominant hubs propagate excess volatility.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_17660
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Network Heterogeneity and Value of Information
Murayama, Kota
Theoretical Economics
Does greater connectivity enhance the value of public information? I study a networked beauty contest game where agents balance adaptation to the fundamental with local coordination. The analysis reveals a stark non-monotonicity: while public disclosure improves welfare when interactions are uniform, regardless of their intensity, it can be detrimental in core-periphery structures. This welfare loss stems from a distortion driven by the core, where core agents over-respond to a noisy public signal, forcing peripheral neighbors to absorb this volatility to maintain alignment. These findings suggest that standard transparency policies can backfire in tiered markets where dominant hubs propagate excess volatility.
title Network Heterogeneity and Value of Information
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.17660