Improving Black-Box Generative Attacks via Generator Semantic Consistency

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Hauptverfasser: Jeong, Jongoh, Yang, Hunmin, Jeong, Jaeseok, Yoon, Kuk-Jin
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
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author Jeong, Jongoh
Yang, Hunmin
Jeong, Jaeseok
Yoon, Kuk-Jin
author_facet Jeong, Jongoh
Yang, Hunmin
Jeong, Jaeseok
Yoon, Kuk-Jin
contents Transfer attacks optimize on a surrogate and deploy to a black-box target. While iterative optimization attacks in this paradigm are limited by their per-input cost limits efficiency and scalability due to multistep gradient updates for each input, generative attacks alleviate these by producing adversarial examples in a single forward pass at test time. However, current generative attacks still adhere to optimizing surrogate losses (e.g., feature divergence) and overlook the generator's internal dynamics, underexploring how the generator's internal representations shape transferable perturbations. To address this, we enforce semantic consistency by aligning the early generator's intermediate features to an EMA teacher, stabilizing object-aligned representations and improving black-box transfer without inference-time overhead. To ground the mechanism, we quantify semantic stability as the standard deviation of foreground IoU between cluster-derived activation masks and foreground masks across generator blocks, and observe reduced semantic drift under our method. For more reliable evaluation, we also introduce Accidental Correction Rate (ACR) to separate inadvertent corrections from intended misclassifications, complementing the inherent blind spots in traditional Attack Success Rate (ASR), Fooling Rate (FR), and Accuracy metrics. Across architectures, domains, and tasks, our approach can be seamlessly integrated into existing generative attacks with consistent improvements in black-box transfer, while maintaining test-time efficiency.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_18248
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Improving Black-Box Generative Attacks via Generator Semantic Consistency
Jeong, Jongoh
Yang, Hunmin
Jeong, Jaeseok
Yoon, Kuk-Jin
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Artificial Intelligence
Transfer attacks optimize on a surrogate and deploy to a black-box target. While iterative optimization attacks in this paradigm are limited by their per-input cost limits efficiency and scalability due to multistep gradient updates for each input, generative attacks alleviate these by producing adversarial examples in a single forward pass at test time. However, current generative attacks still adhere to optimizing surrogate losses (e.g., feature divergence) and overlook the generator's internal dynamics, underexploring how the generator's internal representations shape transferable perturbations. To address this, we enforce semantic consistency by aligning the early generator's intermediate features to an EMA teacher, stabilizing object-aligned representations and improving black-box transfer without inference-time overhead. To ground the mechanism, we quantify semantic stability as the standard deviation of foreground IoU between cluster-derived activation masks and foreground masks across generator blocks, and observe reduced semantic drift under our method. For more reliable evaluation, we also introduce Accidental Correction Rate (ACR) to separate inadvertent corrections from intended misclassifications, complementing the inherent blind spots in traditional Attack Success Rate (ASR), Fooling Rate (FR), and Accuracy metrics. Across architectures, domains, and tasks, our approach can be seamlessly integrated into existing generative attacks with consistent improvements in black-box transfer, while maintaining test-time efficiency.
title Improving Black-Box Generative Attacks via Generator Semantic Consistency
topic Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.18248