Fair Allocation with Money: What is Your Objective?

Fuente: arXiv
Salvato in:
Dettagli Bibliografici
Autori principali: Elmalem, Noga Klein, Gonen, Rica, Segal-Halevi, Erel
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
Soggetti:
Accesso online:
Tags: Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
_version_ 1866909657547669504
author Elmalem, Noga Klein
Gonen, Rica
Segal-Halevi, Erel
author_facet Elmalem, Noga Klein
Gonen, Rica
Segal-Halevi, Erel
contents When allocating indivisible items, there are various ways to use monetary transfers for eliminating envy. Particularly, one can apply a balanced vector of transfer payments, or charge each agent a positive amount, or -- contrarily -- give each agent a positive amount as a ``subsidy''. In each model, one can aim to minimize the amount of payments used; this aim translates into different optimization objectives in each setting. This note compares the various models, and the relations between upper and lower bounds for these objectives.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_18794
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Fair Allocation with Money: What is Your Objective?
Elmalem, Noga Klein
Gonen, Rica
Segal-Halevi, Erel
Computer Science and Game Theory
Theoretical Economics
When allocating indivisible items, there are various ways to use monetary transfers for eliminating envy. Particularly, one can apply a balanced vector of transfer payments, or charge each agent a positive amount, or -- contrarily -- give each agent a positive amount as a ``subsidy''. In each model, one can aim to minimize the amount of payments used; this aim translates into different optimization objectives in each setting. This note compares the various models, and the relations between upper and lower bounds for these objectives.
title Fair Allocation with Money: What is Your Objective?
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.18794