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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| Accès en ligne: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.18957 |
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| _version_ | 1866918068916060160 |
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| author | Khan, Sheraz Madhavan, Subha Natarajan, Kannan |
| author_facet | Khan, Sheraz Madhavan, Subha Natarajan, Kannan |
| contents | The recent work by Shojaee et al. (2025), titled The Illusion of Thinking: Understanding the Strengths and Limitations of Reasoning Models via the Lens of Problem Complexity, presents a compelling empirical finding, a reasoning cliff, where the performance of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) collapses beyond a specific complexity threshold, which the authors posit as an intrinsic scaling limitation of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. This commentary, while acknowledging the study's methodological rigor, contends that this conclusion is confounded by experimental artifacts. We argue that the observed failure is not evidence of a fundamental cognitive boundary, but rather a predictable outcome of system-level constraints in the static, text-only evaluation paradigm, including tool use restrictions, context window recall issues, the absence of crucial cognitive baselines, inadequate statistical reporting, and output generation limits. We reframe this performance collapse through the lens of an agentic gap, asserting that the models are not failing at reasoning, but at execution within a profoundly restrictive interface. We empirically substantiate this critique by demonstrating a striking reversal. A model, initially declaring a puzzle impossible when confined to text-only generation, now employs agentic tools to not only solve it but also master variations of complexity far beyond the reasoning cliff it previously failed to surmount. Additionally, our empirical analysis of tool-enabled models like o4-mini and GPT-4o reveals a hierarchy of agentic reasoning, from simple procedural execution to complex meta-cognitive self-correction, which has significant implications for how we define and measure machine intelligence. The illusion of thinking attributed to LRMs is less a reasoning deficit and more a consequence of an otherwise capable mind lacking the tools for action. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_18957 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Comment On "The Illusion of Thinking": Reframing the Reasoning Cliff as an Agentic Gap Khan, Sheraz Madhavan, Subha Natarajan, Kannan Artificial Intelligence Computation and Language Machine Learning The recent work by Shojaee et al. (2025), titled The Illusion of Thinking: Understanding the Strengths and Limitations of Reasoning Models via the Lens of Problem Complexity, presents a compelling empirical finding, a reasoning cliff, where the performance of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) collapses beyond a specific complexity threshold, which the authors posit as an intrinsic scaling limitation of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. This commentary, while acknowledging the study's methodological rigor, contends that this conclusion is confounded by experimental artifacts. We argue that the observed failure is not evidence of a fundamental cognitive boundary, but rather a predictable outcome of system-level constraints in the static, text-only evaluation paradigm, including tool use restrictions, context window recall issues, the absence of crucial cognitive baselines, inadequate statistical reporting, and output generation limits. We reframe this performance collapse through the lens of an agentic gap, asserting that the models are not failing at reasoning, but at execution within a profoundly restrictive interface. We empirically substantiate this critique by demonstrating a striking reversal. A model, initially declaring a puzzle impossible when confined to text-only generation, now employs agentic tools to not only solve it but also master variations of complexity far beyond the reasoning cliff it previously failed to surmount. Additionally, our empirical analysis of tool-enabled models like o4-mini and GPT-4o reveals a hierarchy of agentic reasoning, from simple procedural execution to complex meta-cognitive self-correction, which has significant implications for how we define and measure machine intelligence. The illusion of thinking attributed to LRMs is less a reasoning deficit and more a consequence of an otherwise capable mind lacking the tools for action. |
| title | A Comment On "The Illusion of Thinking": Reframing the Reasoning Cliff as an Agentic Gap |
| topic | Artificial Intelligence Computation and Language Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.18957 |