Endogenous Feedback in Coevolutionary Games Reshapes the Stability of Cooperation
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866913135279996928 |
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| author | Quetti, Federico Maria Civilini, Andrea Frigerio, Giacomo Figini, Silvia Livan, Giacomo Latora, Vito |
| author_facet | Quetti, Federico Maria Civilini, Andrea Frigerio, Giacomo Figini, Silvia Livan, Giacomo Latora, Vito |
| contents | In Evolutionary game theory the payoffs are typically fixed or shaped by external environmental variables. Here, we introduce an endogenous-feedback model in which the game played coevolves directly with the population state: the payoff matrix is a time-dependent function of the level of cooperation. This allows strategic incentives to be continuously modified by the collective behavior they generate. Even in the simplest case of linear and instantaneous feedback, the model reveals feedback-induced regimes, termed chimera games, in which stable cooperation arises despite being incompatible with the predictions of standard fixed-game dynamics. We further show that delayed feedback can destabilize these equilibria and generate sustained oscillations, while nonlinear feedback reshapes equilibrium structure and introduces path dependence. Our results show how cooperation can be promoted, suppressed, or destabilized by incentives generated endogenously by the very same population's collective behavior. We conclude by outlining how our framework connects to real-world systems shaped by endogenous feedback. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_20603 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Endogenous Feedback in Coevolutionary Games Reshapes the Stability of Cooperation Quetti, Federico Maria Civilini, Andrea Frigerio, Giacomo Figini, Silvia Livan, Giacomo Latora, Vito Physics and Society In Evolutionary game theory the payoffs are typically fixed or shaped by external environmental variables. Here, we introduce an endogenous-feedback model in which the game played coevolves directly with the population state: the payoff matrix is a time-dependent function of the level of cooperation. This allows strategic incentives to be continuously modified by the collective behavior they generate. Even in the simplest case of linear and instantaneous feedback, the model reveals feedback-induced regimes, termed chimera games, in which stable cooperation arises despite being incompatible with the predictions of standard fixed-game dynamics. We further show that delayed feedback can destabilize these equilibria and generate sustained oscillations, while nonlinear feedback reshapes equilibrium structure and introduces path dependence. Our results show how cooperation can be promoted, suppressed, or destabilized by incentives generated endogenously by the very same population's collective behavior. We conclude by outlining how our framework connects to real-world systems shaped by endogenous feedback. |
| title | Endogenous Feedback in Coevolutionary Games Reshapes the Stability of Cooperation |
| topic | Physics and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.20603 |