Institutional Noise, Strategic Deviation, and Intertemporal Collapse: A Formal Model of Miner Behaviour under Protocol Uncertainty
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866918070570713088 |
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| author | Wright, Craig Steven |
| author_facet | Wright, Craig Steven |
| contents | This paper develops a formal game-theoretic model to examine how protocol mutability disrupts cooperative mining behaviour in blockchain systems. Using a repeated game framework with stochastic rule shocks, we show that even minor uncertainty in institutional rules increases time preference and induces strategic deviation. Fixed-rule environments support long-term investment and stable equilibrium strategies; in contrast, mutable protocols lead to short-termism, higher discounting, and collapse of coordinated engagement. Simulation results identify instability zones in the parameter space where rational mining gives way to extractive or arbitrage conduct. These findings support an Austrian economic interpretation: calculability requires rule stability. Institutional noise undermines the informational basis for productive action. We conclude that protocol design must be treated as a constitutional economic constraint, not a discretionary variable, if sustainable cooperation is to emerge in decentralised systems. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_20992 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Institutional Noise, Strategic Deviation, and Intertemporal Collapse: A Formal Model of Miner Behaviour under Protocol Uncertainty Wright, Craig Steven General Economics Economics Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science Computers and Society Computer Science and Game Theory Social and Information Networks 91A05, 91B42, 68M14, 91B62 J.4; C.2.4; K.4.1; F.1.1 This paper develops a formal game-theoretic model to examine how protocol mutability disrupts cooperative mining behaviour in blockchain systems. Using a repeated game framework with stochastic rule shocks, we show that even minor uncertainty in institutional rules increases time preference and induces strategic deviation. Fixed-rule environments support long-term investment and stable equilibrium strategies; in contrast, mutable protocols lead to short-termism, higher discounting, and collapse of coordinated engagement. Simulation results identify instability zones in the parameter space where rational mining gives way to extractive or arbitrage conduct. These findings support an Austrian economic interpretation: calculability requires rule stability. Institutional noise undermines the informational basis for productive action. We conclude that protocol design must be treated as a constitutional economic constraint, not a discretionary variable, if sustainable cooperation is to emerge in decentralised systems. |
| title | Institutional Noise, Strategic Deviation, and Intertemporal Collapse: A Formal Model of Miner Behaviour under Protocol Uncertainty |
| topic | General Economics Economics Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science Computers and Society Computer Science and Game Theory Social and Information Networks 91A05, 91B42, 68M14, 91B62 J.4; C.2.4; K.4.1; F.1.1 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.20992 |