Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning Scheme with Mitigating Model Poisoning Attacks: Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866908472565563392 |
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| author | Wu, Jiahui Luo, Fucai Sun, Tiecheng Wang, Haiyan Zhang, Weizhe |
| author_facet | Wu, Jiahui Luo, Fucai Sun, Tiecheng Wang, Haiyan Zhang, Weizhe |
| contents | The privacy-preserving federated learning schemes based on the setting of two honest-but-curious and non-colluding servers offer promising solutions in terms of security and efficiency. However, our investigation reveals that these schemes still suffer from privacy leakage when considering model poisoning attacks from malicious users. Specifically, we demonstrate that the privacy-preserving computation process for defending against model poisoning attacks inadvertently leaks privacy to one of the honest-but-curious servers, enabling it to access users' gradients in plaintext. To address both privacy leakage and model poisoning attacks, we propose an enhanced privacy-preserving and Byzantine-robust federated learning (PBFL) scheme, comprising three components: (1) a two-trapdoor fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme to bolster users' privacy protection; (2) a novel secure normalization judgment method to preemptively thwart gradient poisoning; and (3) an innovative secure cosine similarity measurement method for detecting model poisoning attacks without compromising data privacy. Our scheme guarantees privacy preservation and resilience against model poisoning attacks, even in scenarios with heterogeneous, non-IID (Independently and Identically Distributed) datasets. Theoretical analyses substantiate the security and efficiency of our scheme, and extensive experiments corroborate the efficacy of our private attacks. Furthermore, the experimental results demonstrate that our scheme accelerates training speed while reducing communication overhead compared to the state-of-the-art PBFL schemes. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_23622 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning Scheme with Mitigating Model Poisoning Attacks: Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures Wu, Jiahui Luo, Fucai Sun, Tiecheng Wang, Haiyan Zhang, Weizhe Cryptography and Security The privacy-preserving federated learning schemes based on the setting of two honest-but-curious and non-colluding servers offer promising solutions in terms of security and efficiency. However, our investigation reveals that these schemes still suffer from privacy leakage when considering model poisoning attacks from malicious users. Specifically, we demonstrate that the privacy-preserving computation process for defending against model poisoning attacks inadvertently leaks privacy to one of the honest-but-curious servers, enabling it to access users' gradients in plaintext. To address both privacy leakage and model poisoning attacks, we propose an enhanced privacy-preserving and Byzantine-robust federated learning (PBFL) scheme, comprising three components: (1) a two-trapdoor fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme to bolster users' privacy protection; (2) a novel secure normalization judgment method to preemptively thwart gradient poisoning; and (3) an innovative secure cosine similarity measurement method for detecting model poisoning attacks without compromising data privacy. Our scheme guarantees privacy preservation and resilience against model poisoning attacks, even in scenarios with heterogeneous, non-IID (Independently and Identically Distributed) datasets. Theoretical analyses substantiate the security and efficiency of our scheme, and extensive experiments corroborate the efficacy of our private attacks. Furthermore, the experimental results demonstrate that our scheme accelerates training speed while reducing communication overhead compared to the state-of-the-art PBFL schemes. |
| title | Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning Scheme with Mitigating Model Poisoning Attacks: Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.23622 |