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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| Accès en ligne: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.24072 |
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| _version_ | 1866909667463004160 |
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| author | Ramanujam, R Sundararajan, Vaishnavi Suresh, S P |
| author_facet | Ramanujam, R Sundararajan, Vaishnavi Suresh, S P |
| contents | We present a different proof of the insecurity problem for XOR, solved in by Chevalier, Kuesters, Rusinowitch and Turuani (2005). Our proof uses the notion of typed terms and well-typed proofs, and removes a restriction on the class of protocols to which the [CKRT05] proof applies, by introducing a slightly different (but very natural) notion of protocols, where honest agent sends are derivable from previous receives in the same session. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_24072 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Protocol insecurity with finitely many sessions and XOR Ramanujam, R Sundararajan, Vaishnavi Suresh, S P Logic in Computer Science Cryptography and Security We present a different proof of the insecurity problem for XOR, solved in by Chevalier, Kuesters, Rusinowitch and Turuani (2005). Our proof uses the notion of typed terms and well-typed proofs, and removes a restriction on the class of protocols to which the [CKRT05] proof applies, by introducing a slightly different (but very natural) notion of protocols, where honest agent sends are derivable from previous receives in the same session. |
| title | Protocol insecurity with finitely many sessions and XOR |
| topic | Logic in Computer Science Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.24072 |