Endogenous Network Structures with Precision and Dimension Choices
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866917114981384192 |
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| author | Kumar, Nikhil |
| author_facet | Kumar, Nikhil |
| contents | This paper presents a social learning model where the network structure is endogenously determined by signal precision and dimension choices. Agents not only choose the precision of their signals and what dimension of the state to learn about, but these decisions directly determine the underlying network structure on which social learning occurs. We show that under a fixed network structure, the optimal precision choice is sublinear in the agent's stationary influence in the network, and this individually optimal choice is worse than the socially optimal choice by a factor of $n^{1/3}$. Under a dynamic network structure, we specify the network by defining a kernel distance between agents, which then determines how much weight agents place on one another. Agents choose dimensions to learn about such that their choice minimizes the squared sum of influences of all agents: a network with equally distributed influence across agents is ideal. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_00249 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Endogenous Network Structures with Precision and Dimension Choices Kumar, Nikhil Theoretical Economics Social and Information Networks This paper presents a social learning model where the network structure is endogenously determined by signal precision and dimension choices. Agents not only choose the precision of their signals and what dimension of the state to learn about, but these decisions directly determine the underlying network structure on which social learning occurs. We show that under a fixed network structure, the optimal precision choice is sublinear in the agent's stationary influence in the network, and this individually optimal choice is worse than the socially optimal choice by a factor of $n^{1/3}$. Under a dynamic network structure, we specify the network by defining a kernel distance between agents, which then determines how much weight agents place on one another. Agents choose dimensions to learn about such that their choice minimizes the squared sum of influences of all agents: a network with equally distributed influence across agents is ideal. |
| title | Endogenous Network Structures with Precision and Dimension Choices |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Social and Information Networks |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.00249 |