Multi-Agent Coordination under Poisson Observations: A Global Game Approach

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Vasconcelos, Marcos M., Touri, Behrouz
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Vasconcelos, Marcos M.
Touri, Behrouz
author_facet Vasconcelos, Marcos M.
Touri, Behrouz
contents We study a model of strategic coordination based on a class of games with incomplete information known as Global Games. Under the assumption of Poisson-distributed signals and a Gamma prior distribution on state of the system, we demonstrate the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium within the class of threshold policies for utility functions that are linear in the agents' actions. Although computing the exact threshold that constitutes an equilibrium in a system with finitely many agents is a highly non-trivial task, the problem becomes tractable by analyzing the game's potential function with countably infinitely many agents. Through numerical examples, we provide evidence that the resulting potential function is unimodal, exhibiting a well-defined maximum. Our results are applicable to the modeling of bacterial Quorum Sensing systems, whose noisy observation signals are often well-approximated using Poisson processes.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_00424
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Multi-Agent Coordination under Poisson Observations: A Global Game Approach
Vasconcelos, Marcos M.
Touri, Behrouz
Systems and Control
We study a model of strategic coordination based on a class of games with incomplete information known as Global Games. Under the assumption of Poisson-distributed signals and a Gamma prior distribution on state of the system, we demonstrate the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium within the class of threshold policies for utility functions that are linear in the agents' actions. Although computing the exact threshold that constitutes an equilibrium in a system with finitely many agents is a highly non-trivial task, the problem becomes tractable by analyzing the game's potential function with countably infinitely many agents. Through numerical examples, we provide evidence that the resulting potential function is unimodal, exhibiting a well-defined maximum. Our results are applicable to the modeling of bacterial Quorum Sensing systems, whose noisy observation signals are often well-approximated using Poisson processes.
title Multi-Agent Coordination under Poisson Observations: A Global Game Approach
topic Systems and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.00424