Resolving CAP Through Automata-Theoretic Economic Design: A Unified Mathematical Framework for Real-Time Partition-Tolerant Systems

Fuente: arXiv
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Autor principal: Wright, Craig S
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2025
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author Wright, Craig S
author_facet Wright, Craig S
contents The CAP theorem asserts a trilemma between consistency, availability, and partition tolerance. This paper introduces a rigorous automata-theoretic and economically grounded framework that reframes the CAP trade-off as a constraint optimization problem. We model distributed systems as partition-aware state machines and embed economic incentive layers to stabilize consensus behavior across adversarially partitioned networks. By incorporating game-theoretic mechanisms into the global transition semantics, we define provable bounds on convergence, liveness, and correctness. Our results demonstrate that availability and consistency can be simultaneously preserved within bounded epsilon margins, effectively extending the classical CAP limits through formal economic control.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_02464
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Resolving CAP Through Automata-Theoretic Economic Design: A Unified Mathematical Framework for Real-Time Partition-Tolerant Systems
Wright, Craig S
Computer Science and Game Theory
Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
Formal Languages and Automata Theory
Information Retrieval
General Economics
Economics
68M14, 91A05, 68Q85
C.2.4; D.2.4; F.1.1
The CAP theorem asserts a trilemma between consistency, availability, and partition tolerance. This paper introduces a rigorous automata-theoretic and economically grounded framework that reframes the CAP trade-off as a constraint optimization problem. We model distributed systems as partition-aware state machines and embed economic incentive layers to stabilize consensus behavior across adversarially partitioned networks. By incorporating game-theoretic mechanisms into the global transition semantics, we define provable bounds on convergence, liveness, and correctness. Our results demonstrate that availability and consistency can be simultaneously preserved within bounded epsilon margins, effectively extending the classical CAP limits through formal economic control.
title Resolving CAP Through Automata-Theoretic Economic Design: A Unified Mathematical Framework for Real-Time Partition-Tolerant Systems
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
Formal Languages and Automata Theory
Information Retrieval
General Economics
Economics
68M14, 91A05, 68Q85
C.2.4; D.2.4; F.1.1
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.02464