A contemporary approach on revisited cost allocation using airport games: the effects of code-sharing
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866912464651681792 |
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| author | Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria |
| author_facet | Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria |
| contents | An important operational aspect in airport management is the allocation of fees to aircraft movements on a runway, whether operated by separate operators or under code-sharing agreements. This paper analyses the problem of determining fees under code-sharing of the movements at an airport from a game theoretic perspective. In particular, we propose the configuration value for games with coalition configuration as the mechanism for allocating operating costs. We provide the exact expression of this game-theoretic solution for airport games, which depends only on the parameters of the associated airport problem. For this purpose, we consider a new and natural game-theoretic characterization of the configuration value. Finally, for the specific context of airport games, we apply it to a real case as a mechanism to determine the aircraft fees at a Spanish airport in a code-sharing scenario. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_02894 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A contemporary approach on revisited cost allocation using airport games: the effects of code-sharing Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory An important operational aspect in airport management is the allocation of fees to aircraft movements on a runway, whether operated by separate operators or under code-sharing agreements. This paper analyses the problem of determining fees under code-sharing of the movements at an airport from a game theoretic perspective. In particular, we propose the configuration value for games with coalition configuration as the mechanism for allocating operating costs. We provide the exact expression of this game-theoretic solution for airport games, which depends only on the parameters of the associated airport problem. For this purpose, we consider a new and natural game-theoretic characterization of the configuration value. Finally, for the specific context of airport games, we apply it to a real case as a mechanism to determine the aircraft fees at a Spanish airport in a code-sharing scenario. |
| title | A contemporary approach on revisited cost allocation using airport games: the effects of code-sharing |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.02894 |