Attraction of the core and the cohesion flow
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866915371282333696 |
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| author | Mermoud, Dylan Laplace |
| author_facet | Mermoud, Dylan Laplace |
| contents | We adopt a continuous-time dynamical system approach to study the evolution of the state of a game driven by the willingness to reduce the total dissatisfaction of the coalitions about their payment. Inspired by the work of Grabisch and Sudhölter about core stability, we define a vector field on the set of preimputations from which is defined, for any preimputation, a cohesion curve describing the evolution of the state. We prove that for each preimputation, there exists a unique cohesion curve. Subsequently, we show that, for the cohesion flow of a balanced game, the core is the unique minimal attractor of the flow, the realm of which is the whole preimputation set. These results improve our understanding of the ubiquity of the core in the study of cooperative games with transferable utility. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_02918 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Attraction of the core and the cohesion flow Mermoud, Dylan Laplace Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory Classical Analysis and ODEs Dynamical Systems 91A12, 37N40 We adopt a continuous-time dynamical system approach to study the evolution of the state of a game driven by the willingness to reduce the total dissatisfaction of the coalitions about their payment. Inspired by the work of Grabisch and Sudhölter about core stability, we define a vector field on the set of preimputations from which is defined, for any preimputation, a cohesion curve describing the evolution of the state. We prove that for each preimputation, there exists a unique cohesion curve. Subsequently, we show that, for the cohesion flow of a balanced game, the core is the unique minimal attractor of the flow, the realm of which is the whole preimputation set. These results improve our understanding of the ubiquity of the core in the study of cooperative games with transferable utility. |
| title | Attraction of the core and the cohesion flow |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory Classical Analysis and ODEs Dynamical Systems 91A12, 37N40 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.02918 |