Beyond Advertising: Mechanism Design for Platform-Wide Marketing Service "QuanZhanTui"
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | Li, Ningyuan, Zhang, Zhilin, Long, Tianyan, Liu, Yuyao, Bai, Rongquan, Chen, Yurong, Deng, Xiaotie, Wang, Pengjie, Yu, Chuan, Xu, Jian, Zheng, Bo |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
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