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Ex-Ante Truthful Distribution-Reporting Mechanisms

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Deng, Xiaotie, Guan, Yanru, Li, Ningyuan, Wang, Zihe, Zhang, Jie
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2025
Sujets:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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