Deterministic Refund Mechanisms
Fuente:
arXiv
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , , , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| _version_ | 1866912468364689408 |
|---|---|
| author | Alaei, Saeed Chawla, Shuchi Huang, Zhiyi Makhdoumi, Ali Malekian, Azarakhsh |
| author_facet | Alaei, Saeed Chawla, Shuchi Huang, Zhiyi Makhdoumi, Ali Malekian, Azarakhsh |
| contents | We consider a mechanism design setting with a single item and a single buyer who is uncertain about the value of the item. Both the buyer and the seller have a common model for the buyer's value, but the buyer discovers her true value only upon receiving the item. Mechanisms in this setting can be interpreted as randomized refund mechanisms, which allocate the item at some price and then offer a (partial and/or randomized) refund to the buyer in exchange for the item if the buyer is unsatisfied with her purchase. Motivated by their practical importance, we study the design of optimal deterministic mechanisms in this setting. We characterize optimal mechanisms as virtual value maximizers for both continuous and discrete type settings. We then use this characterization, along with bounds on the menu size complexity, to develop efficient algorithms for finding optimal and near-optimal deterministic mechanisms. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_04148 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Deterministic Refund Mechanisms Alaei, Saeed Chawla, Shuchi Huang, Zhiyi Makhdoumi, Ali Malekian, Azarakhsh Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics We consider a mechanism design setting with a single item and a single buyer who is uncertain about the value of the item. Both the buyer and the seller have a common model for the buyer's value, but the buyer discovers her true value only upon receiving the item. Mechanisms in this setting can be interpreted as randomized refund mechanisms, which allocate the item at some price and then offer a (partial and/or randomized) refund to the buyer in exchange for the item if the buyer is unsatisfied with her purchase. Motivated by their practical importance, we study the design of optimal deterministic mechanisms in this setting. We characterize optimal mechanisms as virtual value maximizers for both continuous and discrete type settings. We then use this characterization, along with bounds on the menu size complexity, to develop efficient algorithms for finding optimal and near-optimal deterministic mechanisms. |
| title | Deterministic Refund Mechanisms |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.04148 |