An efficiency ordering of k-price auctions under complete information
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866909679169306624 |
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| author | Goel, Sumit Zeidel, Jeffrey |
| author_facet | Goel, Sumit Zeidel, Jeffrey |
| contents | We study $k$-price auctions in a complete information environment and characterize all pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes. In a setting with $n$ agents having ordered valuations, we show that any agent, except those with the lowest $k-2$ valuations, can win in equilibrium. As a consequence, worst-case welfare increases monotonically as we go from $k=2$ (second-price auction) to $k=n$ (lowest-price auction), with the first-price auction achieving the highest worst-case welfare. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_05738 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | An efficiency ordering of k-price auctions under complete information Goel, Sumit Zeidel, Jeffrey Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory We study $k$-price auctions in a complete information environment and characterize all pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes. In a setting with $n$ agents having ordered valuations, we show that any agent, except those with the lowest $k-2$ valuations, can win in equilibrium. As a consequence, worst-case welfare increases monotonically as we go from $k=2$ (second-price auction) to $k=n$ (lowest-price auction), with the first-price auction achieving the highest worst-case welfare. |
| title | An efficiency ordering of k-price auctions under complete information |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.05738 |