CAVGAN: Unifying Jailbreak and Defense of LLMs via Generative Adversarial Attacks on their Internal Representations

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Li, Xiaohu, Ning, Yunfeng, Bao, Zepeng, Xu, Mayi, Chen, Jianhao, Qian, Tieyun
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Li, Xiaohu
Ning, Yunfeng
Bao, Zepeng
Xu, Mayi
Chen, Jianhao
Qian, Tieyun
author_facet Li, Xiaohu
Ning, Yunfeng
Bao, Zepeng
Xu, Mayi
Chen, Jianhao
Qian, Tieyun
contents Security alignment enables the Large Language Model (LLM) to gain the protection against malicious queries, but various jailbreak attack methods reveal the vulnerability of this security mechanism. Previous studies have isolated LLM jailbreak attacks and defenses. We analyze the security protection mechanism of the LLM, and propose a framework that combines attack and defense. Our method is based on the linearly separable property of LLM intermediate layer embedding, as well as the essence of jailbreak attack, which aims to embed harmful problems and transfer them to the safe area. We utilize generative adversarial network (GAN) to learn the security judgment boundary inside the LLM to achieve efficient jailbreak attack and defense. The experimental results indicate that our method achieves an average jailbreak success rate of 88.85\% across three popular LLMs, while the defense success rate on the state-of-the-art jailbreak dataset reaches an average of 84.17\%. This not only validates the effectiveness of our approach but also sheds light on the internal security mechanisms of LLMs, offering new insights for enhancing model security The code and data are available at https://github.com/NLPGM/CAVGAN.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_06043
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle CAVGAN: Unifying Jailbreak and Defense of LLMs via Generative Adversarial Attacks on their Internal Representations
Li, Xiaohu
Ning, Yunfeng
Bao, Zepeng
Xu, Mayi
Chen, Jianhao
Qian, Tieyun
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Security alignment enables the Large Language Model (LLM) to gain the protection against malicious queries, but various jailbreak attack methods reveal the vulnerability of this security mechanism. Previous studies have isolated LLM jailbreak attacks and defenses. We analyze the security protection mechanism of the LLM, and propose a framework that combines attack and defense. Our method is based on the linearly separable property of LLM intermediate layer embedding, as well as the essence of jailbreak attack, which aims to embed harmful problems and transfer them to the safe area. We utilize generative adversarial network (GAN) to learn the security judgment boundary inside the LLM to achieve efficient jailbreak attack and defense. The experimental results indicate that our method achieves an average jailbreak success rate of 88.85\% across three popular LLMs, while the defense success rate on the state-of-the-art jailbreak dataset reaches an average of 84.17\%. This not only validates the effectiveness of our approach but also sheds light on the internal security mechanisms of LLMs, offering new insights for enhancing model security The code and data are available at https://github.com/NLPGM/CAVGAN.
title CAVGAN: Unifying Jailbreak and Defense of LLMs via Generative Adversarial Attacks on their Internal Representations
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.06043