Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866915380864221184 |
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| author | Li, Yang Ma, Yuchao Qi, Qi |
| author_facet | Li, Yang Ma, Yuchao Qi, Qi |
| contents | Online advertising is a vital revenue source for major internet platforms. Recently, joint advertising, which assigns a bundle of two advertisers in an ad slot instead of allocating a single advertiser, has emerged as an effective method for enhancing allocation efficiency and revenue. However, existing mechanisms for joint advertising fail to realize the optimality, as they tend to focus on individual advertisers and overlook bundle structures. This paper identifies an optimal mechanism for joint advertising in a single-slot setting. For multi-slot joint advertising, we propose \textbf{BundleNet}, a novel bundle-based neural network approach specifically designed for joint advertising. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that the mechanisms generated by \textbf{BundleNet} approximate the theoretical analysis results in the single-slot setting and achieve state-of-the-art performance in the multi-slot setting. This significantly increases platform revenue while ensuring approximate dominant strategy incentive compatibility and individual rationality. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_07418 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Li, Yang Ma, Yuchao Qi, Qi Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Online advertising is a vital revenue source for major internet platforms. Recently, joint advertising, which assigns a bundle of two advertisers in an ad slot instead of allocating a single advertiser, has emerged as an effective method for enhancing allocation efficiency and revenue. However, existing mechanisms for joint advertising fail to realize the optimality, as they tend to focus on individual advertisers and overlook bundle structures. This paper identifies an optimal mechanism for joint advertising in a single-slot setting. For multi-slot joint advertising, we propose \textbf{BundleNet}, a novel bundle-based neural network approach specifically designed for joint advertising. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that the mechanisms generated by \textbf{BundleNet} approximate the theoretical analysis results in the single-slot setting and achieve state-of-the-art performance in the multi-slot setting. This significantly increases platform revenue while ensuring approximate dominant strategy incentive compatibility and individual rationality. |
| title | Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.07418 |