Circumventing Safety Alignment in Large Language Models Through Embedding Space Toxicity Attenuation
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866909683867975680 |
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| author | Zhang, Zhibo Li, Yuxi Wang, Kailong Yuan, Shuai Shi, Ling Wang, Haoyu |
| author_facet | Zhang, Zhibo Li, Yuxi Wang, Kailong Yuan, Shuai Shi, Ling Wang, Haoyu |
| contents | Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success across domains such as healthcare, education, and cybersecurity. However, this openness also introduces significant security risks, particularly through embedding space poisoning, which is a subtle attack vector where adversaries manipulate the internal semantic representations of input data to bypass safety alignment mechanisms. While previous research has investigated universal perturbation methods, the dynamics of LLM safety alignment at the embedding level remain insufficiently understood. Consequently, more targeted and accurate adversarial perturbation techniques, which pose significant threats, have not been adequately studied.
In this work, we propose ETTA (Embedding Transformation Toxicity Attenuation), a novel framework that identifies and attenuates toxicity-sensitive dimensions in embedding space via linear transformations. ETTA bypasses model refusal behaviors while preserving linguistic coherence, without requiring model fine-tuning or access to training data. Evaluated on five representative open-source LLMs using the AdvBench benchmark, ETTA achieves a high average attack success rate of 88.61%, outperforming the best baseline by 11.34%, and generalizes to safety-enhanced models (e.g., 77.39% ASR on instruction-tuned defenses). These results highlight a critical vulnerability in current alignment strategies and underscore the need for embedding-aware defenses. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_08020 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Circumventing Safety Alignment in Large Language Models Through Embedding Space Toxicity Attenuation Zhang, Zhibo Li, Yuxi Wang, Kailong Yuan, Shuai Shi, Ling Wang, Haoyu Computation and Language Artificial Intelligence Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success across domains such as healthcare, education, and cybersecurity. However, this openness also introduces significant security risks, particularly through embedding space poisoning, which is a subtle attack vector where adversaries manipulate the internal semantic representations of input data to bypass safety alignment mechanisms. While previous research has investigated universal perturbation methods, the dynamics of LLM safety alignment at the embedding level remain insufficiently understood. Consequently, more targeted and accurate adversarial perturbation techniques, which pose significant threats, have not been adequately studied. In this work, we propose ETTA (Embedding Transformation Toxicity Attenuation), a novel framework that identifies and attenuates toxicity-sensitive dimensions in embedding space via linear transformations. ETTA bypasses model refusal behaviors while preserving linguistic coherence, without requiring model fine-tuning or access to training data. Evaluated on five representative open-source LLMs using the AdvBench benchmark, ETTA achieves a high average attack success rate of 88.61%, outperforming the best baseline by 11.34%, and generalizes to safety-enhanced models (e.g., 77.39% ASR on instruction-tuned defenses). These results highlight a critical vulnerability in current alignment strategies and underscore the need for embedding-aware defenses. |
| title | Circumventing Safety Alignment in Large Language Models Through Embedding Space Toxicity Attenuation |
| topic | Computation and Language Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.08020 |