Truth and meaningfulness
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866915382900555776 |
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| author | Weaver, Nik |
| author_facet | Weaver, Nik |
| contents | I outline a new theory of truth that resolves the classical and constructive versions of the liar paradox. The theory features a provably consistent axiomatization of a global self-applicative truth predicate. Truth is defined using Tarski's "convention T", but compositionality is automatic. The correct, non-paradoxical form of Frege's Basic Law V is given.
This paper is a (very) condensed version of the account of truth advanced in my recent book *Constructive Countablism*. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_08289 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Truth and meaningfulness Weaver, Nik Logic I outline a new theory of truth that resolves the classical and constructive versions of the liar paradox. The theory features a provably consistent axiomatization of a global self-applicative truth predicate. Truth is defined using Tarski's "convention T", but compositionality is automatic. The correct, non-paradoxical form of Frege's Basic Law V is given. This paper is a (very) condensed version of the account of truth advanced in my recent book *Constructive Countablism*. |
| title | Truth and meaningfulness |
| topic | Logic |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.08289 |