SSH-Passkeys: Leveraging Web Authentication for Passwordless SSH
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866908447487819776 |
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| author | Kayali, Moe Schmitt, Jonas Roesner, Franziska |
| author_facet | Kayali, Moe Schmitt, Jonas Roesner, Franziska |
| contents | We propose a method for using Web Authentication APIs for SSH authentication, enabling passwordless remote server login with passkeys. These are credentials that are managed throughout the key lifecycle by an authenticator on behalf of the user and offer strong security guarantees.
Passwords remain the dominant mode of SSH authentication, despite their well known flaws such as phishing and reuse. SSH's custom key-based authentication protocol can alleviate these issues but remains vulnerable to key theft. Additionally, it has poor usability, with even knowledgeable users leaking key material and failing to verify fingerprints. Hence, effective key management remains a critical open area in SSH security. In contrast, WebAuthn is a modern authentication standard designed to replace passwords, managing keys on behalf of the user. As a web API, this standard cannot integrate with SSH directly.
We propose a framework to integrate WebAuthn with SSH servers, by using UNIX pluggable authentication modules (PAM). Our approach is backwards-compatible, supports stock SSH servers and requires no new software client-side. It offers protection for cryptographic material at rest, resistance to key leaks, phishing protection, privacy protection and attestation capability. None of these properties are offered by passwords nor traditional SSH keys. We validate these advantages with a structured, conceptual security analysis.
We develop a prototype implementation and conduct a user study to quantify the security advantages of our proposal, testing our prototype with 40 SSH users. The study confirms the security problems of SSH-keys, including 20% of the cohort leaking their private keys. Our SSH-passkeys effectively address these problems: we find a 90% reduction in critical security errors, while reducing authentication time by 4x on average. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_09022 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | SSH-Passkeys: Leveraging Web Authentication for Passwordless SSH Kayali, Moe Schmitt, Jonas Roesner, Franziska Cryptography and Security We propose a method for using Web Authentication APIs for SSH authentication, enabling passwordless remote server login with passkeys. These are credentials that are managed throughout the key lifecycle by an authenticator on behalf of the user and offer strong security guarantees. Passwords remain the dominant mode of SSH authentication, despite their well known flaws such as phishing and reuse. SSH's custom key-based authentication protocol can alleviate these issues but remains vulnerable to key theft. Additionally, it has poor usability, with even knowledgeable users leaking key material and failing to verify fingerprints. Hence, effective key management remains a critical open area in SSH security. In contrast, WebAuthn is a modern authentication standard designed to replace passwords, managing keys on behalf of the user. As a web API, this standard cannot integrate with SSH directly. We propose a framework to integrate WebAuthn with SSH servers, by using UNIX pluggable authentication modules (PAM). Our approach is backwards-compatible, supports stock SSH servers and requires no new software client-side. It offers protection for cryptographic material at rest, resistance to key leaks, phishing protection, privacy protection and attestation capability. None of these properties are offered by passwords nor traditional SSH keys. We validate these advantages with a structured, conceptual security analysis. We develop a prototype implementation and conduct a user study to quantify the security advantages of our proposal, testing our prototype with 40 SSH users. The study confirms the security problems of SSH-keys, including 20% of the cohort leaking their private keys. Our SSH-passkeys effectively address these problems: we find a 90% reduction in critical security errors, while reducing authentication time by 4x on average. |
| title | SSH-Passkeys: Leveraging Web Authentication for Passwordless SSH |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.09022 |