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Autori principali: Shahriar, Md Hasan, Barat, Md Mohaimin Al, Sundar, Harshavardhan, Zhang, Ning, Ramakrishnan, Naren, Hou, Y. Thomas, Lou, Wenjing
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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Accesso online:https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.09095
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author Shahriar, Md Hasan
Barat, Md Mohaimin Al
Sundar, Harshavardhan
Zhang, Ning
Ramakrishnan, Naren
Hou, Y. Thomas
Lou, Wenjing
author_facet Shahriar, Md Hasan
Barat, Md Mohaimin Al
Sundar, Harshavardhan
Zhang, Ning
Ramakrishnan, Naren
Hou, Y. Thomas
Lou, Wenjing
contents Multimodal fusion (MMF) plays a critical role in the perception of autonomous driving, which primarily fuses camera and LiDAR streams for a comprehensive and efficient scene understanding. However, its strict reliance on precise temporal synchronization exposes it to new vulnerabilities. In this paper, we introduce DejaVu, an attack that exploits the in-vehicular network to manipulate the integrity of time and create subtle temporal misalignments, severely degrading downstream MMF-based perception tasks. Our comprehensive attack analysis across different models and datasets reveals the sensors' task-specific imbalanced sensitivities: object detection is overly dependent on LiDAR inputs, while object tracking is highly reliant on the camera inputs. Consequently, with a single-frame LiDAR delay, an attacker can reduce the car detection mAP by up to 88.5%, while with a three-frame camera delay, multiple object tracking accuracy (MOTA) for car drops by 73%. We further demonstrated two attack scenarios using an automotive Ethernet testbed for hardware-in-the-loop validation and the Autoware stack for end-to-end AD simulation, demonstrating the feasibility of the DejaVu attack and its severe impact, such as collisions and phantom braking. Our code and artifacts are publicly available at: https://github.com/shahriar0651/DejaVu.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_09095
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Temporal Misalignment Attacks against Multimodal Perception in Autonomous Driving
Shahriar, Md Hasan
Barat, Md Mohaimin Al
Sundar, Harshavardhan
Zhang, Ning
Ramakrishnan, Naren
Hou, Y. Thomas
Lou, Wenjing
Machine Learning
Multimodal fusion (MMF) plays a critical role in the perception of autonomous driving, which primarily fuses camera and LiDAR streams for a comprehensive and efficient scene understanding. However, its strict reliance on precise temporal synchronization exposes it to new vulnerabilities. In this paper, we introduce DejaVu, an attack that exploits the in-vehicular network to manipulate the integrity of time and create subtle temporal misalignments, severely degrading downstream MMF-based perception tasks. Our comprehensive attack analysis across different models and datasets reveals the sensors' task-specific imbalanced sensitivities: object detection is overly dependent on LiDAR inputs, while object tracking is highly reliant on the camera inputs. Consequently, with a single-frame LiDAR delay, an attacker can reduce the car detection mAP by up to 88.5%, while with a three-frame camera delay, multiple object tracking accuracy (MOTA) for car drops by 73%. We further demonstrated two attack scenarios using an automotive Ethernet testbed for hardware-in-the-loop validation and the Autoware stack for end-to-end AD simulation, demonstrating the feasibility of the DejaVu attack and its severe impact, such as collisions and phantom braking. Our code and artifacts are publicly available at: https://github.com/shahriar0651/DejaVu.
title Temporal Misalignment Attacks against Multimodal Perception in Autonomous Driving
topic Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.09095