Egalitarian-equivalent and strategy-proof mechanisms in homogeneous multi-object allocation problems
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866908447676563456 |
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| author | Kurashita, Hinata Sakai, Ryosuke |
| author_facet | Kurashita, Hinata Sakai, Ryosuke |
| contents | We study the problem of allocating homogeneous and indivisible objects among agents with money. In particular, we investigate the relationship between egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978), as a fairness concept, and efficiency under agents' incentive constraints. As a first result, we characterize the class of mechanisms that satisfy egalitarian-equivalence, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy. Our characterization reveals a strong tension between egalitarian-equivalence and efficiency: under these properties, the mechanisms allocate objects only in limited cases. To address this limitation, we replace strategy-proofness with the weaker incentive property, non-obvious manipulability (Troyan and Morrill, 2020). We show that this relaxation allows us to design mechanisms that achieve efficiency while still ensuring egalitarian-equivalence. Furthermore, upon achieving efficiency, we identify the agent optimal mechanism in the characterized class. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_09152 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Egalitarian-equivalent and strategy-proof mechanisms in homogeneous multi-object allocation problems Kurashita, Hinata Sakai, Ryosuke Theoretical Economics We study the problem of allocating homogeneous and indivisible objects among agents with money. In particular, we investigate the relationship between egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978), as a fairness concept, and efficiency under agents' incentive constraints. As a first result, we characterize the class of mechanisms that satisfy egalitarian-equivalence, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy. Our characterization reveals a strong tension between egalitarian-equivalence and efficiency: under these properties, the mechanisms allocate objects only in limited cases. To address this limitation, we replace strategy-proofness with the weaker incentive property, non-obvious manipulability (Troyan and Morrill, 2020). We show that this relaxation allows us to design mechanisms that achieve efficiency while still ensuring egalitarian-equivalence. Furthermore, upon achieving efficiency, we identify the agent optimal mechanism in the characterized class. |
| title | Egalitarian-equivalent and strategy-proof mechanisms in homogeneous multi-object allocation problems |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.09152 |