Implementing and Evaluating Post-Quantum DNSSEC in CoreDNS
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866915385871171584 |
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| author | Suela, Julio Gento Blanco-Romero, Javier Mendoza, Florina Almenares Díaz-Sánchez, Daniel |
| author_facet | Suela, Julio Gento Blanco-Romero, Javier Mendoza, Florina Almenares Díaz-Sánchez, Daniel |
| contents | The emergence of quantum computers poses a significant threat to current secure service, application and/or protocol implementations that rely on RSA and ECDSA algorithms, for instance DNSSEC, because public-key cryptography based on number factorization or discrete logarithm is vulnerable to quantum attacks. This paper presents the integration of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms into CoreDNS to enable quantum-resistant DNSSEC functionality. We have developed a plugin that extends CoreDNS with support for five PQC signature algorithm families: ML-DSA, FALCON, SPHINCS+, MAYO, and SNOVA. Our implementation maintains compatibility with existing DNS resolution flows while providing on-the-fly signing using quantum-resistant signatures. A benchmark has been performed and performance evaluation results reveal significant trade-offs between security and efficiency. The results indicate that while PQC algorithms introduce operational overhead, several candidates offer viable compromises for transitioning DNSSEC to quantum-resistant cryptography. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_09301 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Implementing and Evaluating Post-Quantum DNSSEC in CoreDNS Suela, Julio Gento Blanco-Romero, Javier Mendoza, Florina Almenares Díaz-Sánchez, Daniel Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture The emergence of quantum computers poses a significant threat to current secure service, application and/or protocol implementations that rely on RSA and ECDSA algorithms, for instance DNSSEC, because public-key cryptography based on number factorization or discrete logarithm is vulnerable to quantum attacks. This paper presents the integration of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms into CoreDNS to enable quantum-resistant DNSSEC functionality. We have developed a plugin that extends CoreDNS with support for five PQC signature algorithm families: ML-DSA, FALCON, SPHINCS+, MAYO, and SNOVA. Our implementation maintains compatibility with existing DNS resolution flows while providing on-the-fly signing using quantum-resistant signatures. A benchmark has been performed and performance evaluation results reveal significant trade-offs between security and efficiency. The results indicate that while PQC algorithms introduce operational overhead, several candidates offer viable compromises for transitioning DNSSEC to quantum-resistant cryptography. |
| title | Implementing and Evaluating Post-Quantum DNSSEC in CoreDNS |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.09301 |