Nash Equilibria with Irradical Probabilities

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Orzech, Edan, Rinard, Martin
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
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author Orzech, Edan
Rinard, Martin
author_facet Orzech, Edan
Rinard, Martin
contents We present for every $n\ge4$ an $n$-player game in normal form with payoffs in $\{0,1,2\}$ that has a unique, fully mixed, Nash equilibrium in which all the probability weights are irradical (i.e., algebraic but not closed form expressible even with $m$-th roots for any integer $m$).
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_09422
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Nash Equilibria with Irradical Probabilities
Orzech, Edan
Rinard, Martin
Computer Science and Game Theory
Number Theory
91A06, 91A10
We present for every $n\ge4$ an $n$-player game in normal form with payoffs in $\{0,1,2\}$ that has a unique, fully mixed, Nash equilibrium in which all the probability weights are irradical (i.e., algebraic but not closed form expressible even with $m$-th roots for any integer $m$).
title Nash Equilibria with Irradical Probabilities
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Number Theory
91A06, 91A10
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.09422