Access Control for Information-Theoretically Secure Key-Document Stores
Fuente:
arXiv
Enregistré dans:
| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
|
| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | |
| Tags: |
Ajouter un tag
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
|
| _version_ | 1866916843693801472 |
|---|---|
| author | Li, Yin Mehrota, Sharad Sharma, Shantanu Kumari, Komal |
| author_facet | Li, Yin Mehrota, Sharad Sharma, Shantanu Kumari, Komal |
| contents | This paper presents a novel key-based access control technique for secure outsourcing key-value stores where values correspond to documents that are indexed and accessed using keys. The proposed approach adopts Shamir's secret-sharing that offers unconditional or information-theoretic security. It supports keyword-based document retrieval while preventing leakage of the data, access rights of users, or the size (\textit{i}.\textit{e}., volume of the output that satisfies a query). The proposed approach allows servers to detect (and abort) malicious clients from gaining unauthorized access to data, and prevents malicious servers from altering data undetected while ensuring efficient access -- it takes 231.5ms over 5,000 keywords across 500,000 files. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_10730 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Access Control for Information-Theoretically Secure Key-Document Stores Li, Yin Mehrota, Sharad Sharma, Shantanu Kumari, Komal Cryptography and Security Databases Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Data Structures and Algorithms Information Retrieval This paper presents a novel key-based access control technique for secure outsourcing key-value stores where values correspond to documents that are indexed and accessed using keys. The proposed approach adopts Shamir's secret-sharing that offers unconditional or information-theoretic security. It supports keyword-based document retrieval while preventing leakage of the data, access rights of users, or the size (\textit{i}.\textit{e}., volume of the output that satisfies a query). The proposed approach allows servers to detect (and abort) malicious clients from gaining unauthorized access to data, and prevents malicious servers from altering data undetected while ensuring efficient access -- it takes 231.5ms over 5,000 keywords across 500,000 files. |
| title | Access Control for Information-Theoretically Secure Key-Document Stores |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Databases Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Data Structures and Algorithms Information Retrieval |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.10730 |