Approximate solutions to games of ordered preference

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Molins, Pau de las Heras, Roy-Almonacid, Eric, Lee, Dong Ho, Peters, Lasse, Fridovich-Keil, David, Bakirtzis, Georgios
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Molins, Pau de las Heras
Roy-Almonacid, Eric
Lee, Dong Ho
Peters, Lasse
Fridovich-Keil, David
Bakirtzis, Georgios
author_facet Molins, Pau de las Heras
Roy-Almonacid, Eric
Lee, Dong Ho
Peters, Lasse
Fridovich-Keil, David
Bakirtzis, Georgios
contents Autonomous vehicles must balance ranked objectives, such as minimizing travel time, ensuring safety, and coordinating with traffic. Games of ordered preference effectively model these interactions but become computationally intractable as the time horizon, number of players, or number of preference levels increase. While receding horizon frameworks mitigate long-horizon intractability by solving sequential shorter games, often warm-started, they do not resolve the complexity growth inherent in existing methods for solving games of ordered preference. This paper introduces a solution strategy that avoids excessive complexity growth by approximating solutions using lexicographic iterated best response (IBR) in receding horizon, termed "lexicographic IBR over time." Lexicographic IBR over time uses past information to accelerate convergence. We demonstrate through simulated traffic scenarios that lexicographic IBR over time efficiently computes approximate-optimal solutions for receding horizon games of ordered preference, converging towards generalized Nash equilibria.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_11021
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Approximate solutions to games of ordered preference
Molins, Pau de las Heras
Roy-Almonacid, Eric
Lee, Dong Ho
Peters, Lasse
Fridovich-Keil, David
Bakirtzis, Georgios
Systems and Control
Computer Science and Game Theory
Autonomous vehicles must balance ranked objectives, such as minimizing travel time, ensuring safety, and coordinating with traffic. Games of ordered preference effectively model these interactions but become computationally intractable as the time horizon, number of players, or number of preference levels increase. While receding horizon frameworks mitigate long-horizon intractability by solving sequential shorter games, often warm-started, they do not resolve the complexity growth inherent in existing methods for solving games of ordered preference. This paper introduces a solution strategy that avoids excessive complexity growth by approximating solutions using lexicographic iterated best response (IBR) in receding horizon, termed "lexicographic IBR over time." Lexicographic IBR over time uses past information to accelerate convergence. We demonstrate through simulated traffic scenarios that lexicographic IBR over time efficiently computes approximate-optimal solutions for receding horizon games of ordered preference, converging towards generalized Nash equilibria.
title Approximate solutions to games of ordered preference
topic Systems and Control
Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.11021