Formal Verification of Neural Certificates Done Dynamically
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866909690501267456 |
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| author | Henzinger, Thomas A. Kueffner, Konstantin Yu, Emily |
| author_facet | Henzinger, Thomas A. Kueffner, Konstantin Yu, Emily |
| contents | Neural certificates have emerged as a powerful tool in cyber-physical systems control, providing witnesses of correctness. These certificates, such as barrier functions, often learned alongside control policies, once verified, serve as mathematical proofs of system safety. However, traditional formal verification of their defining conditions typically faces scalability challenges due to exhaustive state-space exploration. To address this challenge, we propose a lightweight runtime monitoring framework that integrates real-time verification and does not require access to the underlying control policy. Our monitor observes the system during deployment and performs on-the-fly verification of the certificate over a lookahead region to ensure safety within a finite prediction horizon. We instantiate this framework for ReLU-based control barrier functions and demonstrate its practical effectiveness in a case study. Our approach enables timely detection of safety violations and incorrect certificates with minimal overhead, providing an effective but lightweight alternative to the static verification of the certificates. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_11987 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Formal Verification of Neural Certificates Done Dynamically Henzinger, Thomas A. Kueffner, Konstantin Yu, Emily Symbolic Computation Artificial Intelligence Neural certificates have emerged as a powerful tool in cyber-physical systems control, providing witnesses of correctness. These certificates, such as barrier functions, often learned alongside control policies, once verified, serve as mathematical proofs of system safety. However, traditional formal verification of their defining conditions typically faces scalability challenges due to exhaustive state-space exploration. To address this challenge, we propose a lightweight runtime monitoring framework that integrates real-time verification and does not require access to the underlying control policy. Our monitor observes the system during deployment and performs on-the-fly verification of the certificate over a lookahead region to ensure safety within a finite prediction horizon. We instantiate this framework for ReLU-based control barrier functions and demonstrate its practical effectiveness in a case study. Our approach enables timely detection of safety violations and incorrect certificates with minimal overhead, providing an effective but lightweight alternative to the static verification of the certificates. |
| title | Formal Verification of Neural Certificates Done Dynamically |
| topic | Symbolic Computation Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.11987 |