Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Wu, Fei, Sui, Danning, Thiery, Thomas, Pai, Mallesh
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
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author Wu, Fei
Sui, Danning
Thiery, Thomas
Pai, Mallesh
author_facet Wu, Fei
Sui, Danning
Thiery, Thomas
Pai, Mallesh
contents This paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics and dynamics behind arbitrages between centralized and decentralized exchanges (CEX-DEX) on Ethereum. We refine heuristics to identify arbitrage transactions from on-chain data and introduce a robust empirical framework to estimate arbitrage revenue without knowing traders' actual behaviors on CEX. Leveraging an extensive dataset spanning 19 months from August 2023 to March 2025, we estimate a total of 233.8M USD extracted by 19 major CEX-DEX searchers from 7,203,560 identified CEX-DEX arbitrages. Our analysis reveals increasing centralization trends as three searchers captured three-quarters of both volume and extracted value. We also demonstrate that searchers' profitability is tied to their integration level with block builders and uncover exclusive searcher-builder relationships and their market impact. Finally, we correct the previously underestimated profitability of block builders who vertically integrate with a searcher. These insights illuminate the darkest corner of the MEV landscape and highlight the critical implications of CEX-DEX arbitrages for Ethereum's decentralization.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_13023
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest
Wu, Fei
Sui, Danning
Thiery, Thomas
Pai, Mallesh
Cryptography and Security
Trading and Market Microstructure
This paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics and dynamics behind arbitrages between centralized and decentralized exchanges (CEX-DEX) on Ethereum. We refine heuristics to identify arbitrage transactions from on-chain data and introduce a robust empirical framework to estimate arbitrage revenue without knowing traders' actual behaviors on CEX. Leveraging an extensive dataset spanning 19 months from August 2023 to March 2025, we estimate a total of 233.8M USD extracted by 19 major CEX-DEX searchers from 7,203,560 identified CEX-DEX arbitrages. Our analysis reveals increasing centralization trends as three searchers captured three-quarters of both volume and extracted value. We also demonstrate that searchers' profitability is tied to their integration level with block builders and uncover exclusive searcher-builder relationships and their market impact. Finally, we correct the previously underestimated profitability of block builders who vertically integrate with a searcher. These insights illuminate the darkest corner of the MEV landscape and highlight the critical implications of CEX-DEX arbitrages for Ethereum's decentralization.
title Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest
topic Cryptography and Security
Trading and Market Microstructure
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.13023