Coasian Dynamics with Free Disposability and Zero Marginal Cost: Information Goods

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Author: Li, Zihao
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Li, Zihao
author_facet Li, Zihao
contents This paper studies a durable goods monopoly with multiple provision levels, free disposability, and zero marginal cost. We establish a Folk-Theorem-type result: as parties become sufficiently patient, equilibrium seller payoffs contains an interval bounded below by the lowest-type buyer's efficient surplus and above by the maximal static payoff under incentive-compatible mechanisms guaranteeing that type efficient provision. This multiplicity arises because free disposability and zero marginal cost render the efficient provision level non-unique. Our analysis demonstrates how structural features common in information goods can undermine the Coase conjecture.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_13137
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Coasian Dynamics with Free Disposability and Zero Marginal Cost: Information Goods
Li, Zihao
Theoretical Economics
This paper studies a durable goods monopoly with multiple provision levels, free disposability, and zero marginal cost. We establish a Folk-Theorem-type result: as parties become sufficiently patient, equilibrium seller payoffs contains an interval bounded below by the lowest-type buyer's efficient surplus and above by the maximal static payoff under incentive-compatible mechanisms guaranteeing that type efficient provision. This multiplicity arises because free disposability and zero marginal cost render the efficient provision level non-unique. Our analysis demonstrates how structural features common in information goods can undermine the Coase conjecture.
title Coasian Dynamics with Free Disposability and Zero Marginal Cost: Information Goods
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.13137