Imagen de Portada

Fair distribution of bundles

Fuente: arXiv

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal:	Soberón, Pablo
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2025
Materias:	Combinatorics Computer Science and Game Theory 91B32 F.2.2; J.4
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

Ejemplares similares

The Complexity of Extending Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods
por: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Temporal Fair Division in Multi-Agent Systems: From Precise Alternation Metrics to Scalable Coordination Proxies
por: Papadopoulos, Nikolaos Al.
Publicado: (2026)

Fair Division in a Variable Setting
por: Chandramouleeswaran, Harish, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Nash Welfare in Additively Separable Hedonic Games
por: Pagano, Marta, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Selling Privacy in Blockchain Transactions
por: Chionas, Georgios, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

EF1 Allocations for Identical Trilean and Separable Single-Peaked Valuations
por: Bhaskar, Umang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Multidimensional Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design
por: Neogi, Rian, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Properties of Egalitarian Sequences of Committees: Theory and Experiments
por: Böhm, Paula, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Egalitarian Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods
por: Celine, Karen Frilya, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Maps of Tournaments: Distances, Experiments, and Data
por: Nikolow, Filip, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

A Fair and Optimal Approach to Sequential Healthcare Rationing
por: Sun, Zhaohong
Publicado: (2025)

Maximizing Index Diversity in Committee Elections
por: Böhm, Paula, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Compatible $k$-Relaxations of Fairness and Non-Wastefulness Under Hereditary Constraints
por: Wakasugi, Tenma, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

From Independence of Clones to Composition Consistency: A Hierarchy of Barriers to Strategic Nomination
por: Berker, Ratip Emin, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Designing Rules to Pick a Rule: Aggregation by Consistency
por: Berker, Ratip Emin, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Endogenous Epistemic Weighting under Heterogeneous Information
por: Manfredi, Enrico
Publicado: (2026)

A Fair Allocation is Approximately Optimal for Indivisible Chores, or Is It?
por: Li, Bo, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Randomized Strategyproof Mechanisms with Best of Both Worlds Fairness and Efficiency
por: Sun, Ankang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

On the Stability of Learning in Network Games with Many Players
por: Hussain, Aamal, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Computational Intractability of Strategizing against Online Learners
por: Assos, Angelos, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Multi-agent reinforcement learning in the all-or-nothing public goods game on networks
por: Meylahn, Benedikt Valentin
Publicado: (2024)

How Many Votes is a Lie Worth? Measuring Strategyproofness through Resource Augmentation
por: Berker, Ratip Emin, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

On Truthful Mechanisms without Pareto-efficiency: Characterizations and Fairness
por: Babaioff, Moshe, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

PeerBTS: Incentivizing Effort in Strategyproof Peer Selection
por: Lyon, Harper, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Analyzing the Effects of Two-Stage Peer Evaluation
por: Fairstein, Roy, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Zero Carbon V2X Tariffs for Non-Domestic Customers
por: Shamash, Elisheva S, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Maximin Shares in Hereditary Set Systems
por: Hummel, Halvard
Publicado: (2024)

Envy-Free and Pareto-Optimal Allocations for Agents with Asymmetric Random Valuations
por: Bai, Yushi, et al.
Publicado: (2021)

Probabilistic Analysis of Stable Matching in Large Markets with Siblings
por: Sun, Zhaohong, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Achieving Balanced Representation in School Choice with Diversity Goals
por: Sun, Zhaohong, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Stable Matchings in Practice: A Constraint Programming Approach
por: Sun, Zhaohong, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

An $O(\log \log n)$-approximate budget feasible mechanism for subadditive valuations
por: Neogi, Rian, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Multi-Agent Non-Discriminatory Contracts
por: Ding, Ke, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Improved Approximation Ratio for Strategyproof Facility Location on a Cycle
por: Rogowski, Krzysztof, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

A Framework for Graph-Conditioned Hierarchical Shapley Attribution in Patent Valuation
por: Bose, Joy
Publicado: (2026)

MenuNet: A Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Matching Markets
por: Sun, Zhaohong, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Matching Markets with Chores
por: Garg, Jugal, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Bribery Can Get Harder in Structured Multiwinner Approval Election
por: Kusek, Bartosz, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Matroid Bayesian Online Selection
por: DeHaan, Ian, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Fair allocations with subadditive and XOS valuations
por: Feige, Uriel, et al.
Publicado: (2025)