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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.15737 |
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| _version_ | 1866908459073536000 |
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| author | Garrido-Lucero, Felipe Laraki, Rida |
| author_facet | Garrido-Lucero, Felipe Laraki, Rida |
| contents | Matching games is a one-to-one two sided market model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which coupled agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game. They refine the classical pairwise stability by requiring robustness to renegotiation and provide general conditions under which pairwise stable and renegotiation-proof outcomes exist as the limit of a deferred acceptance with competitions algorithm together with a renegotiation process. In this article, we extend their model to a general setting encompassing most of one-to-many matching markets and roommates models and specify two frameworks under which core stable and renegotiation-proof outcomes exist and can be efficiently computed. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_15737 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | General Matching Games Garrido-Lucero, Felipe Laraki, Rida Computer Science and Game Theory Matching games is a one-to-one two sided market model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which coupled agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game. They refine the classical pairwise stability by requiring robustness to renegotiation and provide general conditions under which pairwise stable and renegotiation-proof outcomes exist as the limit of a deferred acceptance with competitions algorithm together with a renegotiation process. In this article, we extend their model to a general setting encompassing most of one-to-many matching markets and roommates models and specify two frameworks under which core stable and renegotiation-proof outcomes exist and can be efficiently computed. |
| title | General Matching Games |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.15737 |