Robust Tournaments
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866908460775374848 |
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| author | Drugov, Mikhail Ryvkin, Dmitry |
| author_facet | Drugov, Mikhail Ryvkin, Dmitry |
| contents | We characterize robust tournament design -- the prize scheme that maximizes the lowest effort in a rank-order tournament where the distribution of noise is unknown, except for an upper bound, $\bar{H}$, on its Shannon entropy. The robust tournament scheme awards positive prizes to all ranks except the last, with a distinct top prize. Asymptotically, the prizes follow the harmonic number sequence and induce an exponential distribution of noise with rate parameter $e^{-\bar{H}}$. The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching $1/2$. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_16348 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Robust Tournaments Drugov, Mikhail Ryvkin, Dmitry Theoretical Economics We characterize robust tournament design -- the prize scheme that maximizes the lowest effort in a rank-order tournament where the distribution of noise is unknown, except for an upper bound, $\bar{H}$, on its Shannon entropy. The robust tournament scheme awards positive prizes to all ranks except the last, with a distinct top prize. Asymptotically, the prizes follow the harmonic number sequence and induce an exponential distribution of noise with rate parameter $e^{-\bar{H}}$. The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching $1/2$. |
| title | Robust Tournaments |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.16348 |