GNSS Jammer and Spoofer Mitigation via Multi-Antenna Processing
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866908464251404288 |
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| author | Elmiger, Jonas Marti, Gian Studer, Christoph |
| author_facet | Elmiger, Jonas Marti, Gian Studer, Christoph |
| contents | Modern positioning relies on radio signals from global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). Their low receive power renders these radio signals susceptible to jamming attacks, in which malicious transmitters emit strong interference to disrupt signal acquisition. Moreover, GNSS are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, in which malicious transmitters mimic legitimate satellites by transmitting spurious GNSS signals. We propose SCHIEBER, a novel method for multi-antenna GNSS receivers that mitigates jammers as well as spoofers without requiring any prior knowledge of the receiver position or attack type: Jammers are mitigated during signal acquisition using a recently developed adaptive spatial filtering technique. Spoofers are identified and rejected after signal acquisition using a novel approach that tests the consistency of acquired signals by comparing their respective direction of arrival (DoA) and pseudorange estimates in a test that is invariant with respect to the unknown receiver position. We demonstrate the efficacy of our method using extensive simulations of a GPS L1 C/A system under spoofing and jamming attacks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_18166 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | GNSS Jammer and Spoofer Mitigation via Multi-Antenna Processing Elmiger, Jonas Marti, Gian Studer, Christoph Signal Processing Information Theory Modern positioning relies on radio signals from global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). Their low receive power renders these radio signals susceptible to jamming attacks, in which malicious transmitters emit strong interference to disrupt signal acquisition. Moreover, GNSS are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, in which malicious transmitters mimic legitimate satellites by transmitting spurious GNSS signals. We propose SCHIEBER, a novel method for multi-antenna GNSS receivers that mitigates jammers as well as spoofers without requiring any prior knowledge of the receiver position or attack type: Jammers are mitigated during signal acquisition using a recently developed adaptive spatial filtering technique. Spoofers are identified and rejected after signal acquisition using a novel approach that tests the consistency of acquired signals by comparing their respective direction of arrival (DoA) and pseudorange estimates in a test that is invariant with respect to the unknown receiver position. We demonstrate the efficacy of our method using extensive simulations of a GPS L1 C/A system under spoofing and jamming attacks. |
| title | GNSS Jammer and Spoofer Mitigation via Multi-Antenna Processing |
| topic | Signal Processing Information Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.18166 |