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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.20175 |
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| _version_ | 1866916944042524672 |
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| author | Rezaei, Hadis Eshghie, Mojtaba Anderesson, Karl Palmieri, Francesco |
| author_facet | Rezaei, Hadis Eshghie, Mojtaba Anderesson, Karl Palmieri, Francesco |
| contents | While catastrophic attacks on Ethereum persist, vulnerability research remains fixated on implementation-level smart contract bugs, creating a gap between academic understanding of vulnerabilities and the root causes of high-impact, real-world incidents. To address this, we employ a two-pronged methodology: first, a systematic literature review of 71 academic papers to build a catalog of 24 active and 5 deprecated vulnerabilities. Second, we conduct an in-depth, empirical analysis of 50 of the most severe real-world attacks between 2022 and 2025, collectively incurring over $1.09B in losses, to identify their root causes. We introduce the concept of "exploit chains" by revealing that many incidents are not caused by isolated vulnerabilities but by combinations of human, operational, and economic design flaws that link with implementation bugs to enable an attack. Our analysis yields insights on how decentralized applications are exploited in practice, leading to a novel, four-tier root-cause framework that moves beyond code-level vulnerabilities. We find that real-world successful attacks on Ethereum (and related networks) trace back to one of the four tiers of (1) protocol logic design, (2) lifecycle and governance, (3) external dependencies, and (4) classic smart contract vulnerabilities. We investigate the suitability of this multi-tier incident root-cause framework via a case study. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_20175 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | SoK: Root Cause of $1 Billion Loss in Smart Contract Real-World Attacks via a Systematic Literature Review of Vulnerabilities Rezaei, Hadis Eshghie, Mojtaba Anderesson, Karl Palmieri, Francesco Cryptography and Security While catastrophic attacks on Ethereum persist, vulnerability research remains fixated on implementation-level smart contract bugs, creating a gap between academic understanding of vulnerabilities and the root causes of high-impact, real-world incidents. To address this, we employ a two-pronged methodology: first, a systematic literature review of 71 academic papers to build a catalog of 24 active and 5 deprecated vulnerabilities. Second, we conduct an in-depth, empirical analysis of 50 of the most severe real-world attacks between 2022 and 2025, collectively incurring over $1.09B in losses, to identify their root causes. We introduce the concept of "exploit chains" by revealing that many incidents are not caused by isolated vulnerabilities but by combinations of human, operational, and economic design flaws that link with implementation bugs to enable an attack. Our analysis yields insights on how decentralized applications are exploited in practice, leading to a novel, four-tier root-cause framework that moves beyond code-level vulnerabilities. We find that real-world successful attacks on Ethereum (and related networks) trace back to one of the four tiers of (1) protocol logic design, (2) lifecycle and governance, (3) external dependencies, and (4) classic smart contract vulnerabilities. We investigate the suitability of this multi-tier incident root-cause framework via a case study. |
| title | SoK: Root Cause of $1 Billion Loss in Smart Contract Real-World Attacks via a Systematic Literature Review of Vulnerabilities |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.20175 |