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Behavioral Study of Dashboard Mechanisms

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Kayongo, Paula, Hullman, Jessica, Hartline, Jason
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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