Learning-based Privacy-Preserving Graph Publishing Against Sensitive Link Inference Attacks

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Wu, Yucheng, Yang, Yuncong, Han, Xiao, Wang, Leye, Wu, Junjie
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2025
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author Wu, Yucheng
Yang, Yuncong
Han, Xiao
Wang, Leye
Wu, Junjie
author_facet Wu, Yucheng
Yang, Yuncong
Han, Xiao
Wang, Leye
Wu, Junjie
contents Publishing graph data is widely desired to enable a variety of structural analyses and downstream tasks. However, it also potentially poses severe privacy leakage, as attackers may leverage the released graph data to launch attacks and precisely infer private information such as the existence of hidden sensitive links in the graph. Prior studies on privacy-preserving graph data publishing relied on heuristic graph modification strategies and it is difficult to determine the graph with the optimal privacy--utility trade-off for publishing. In contrast, we propose the first privacy-preserving graph structure learning framework against sensitive link inference attacks, named PPGSL, which can automatically learn a graph with the optimal privacy--utility trade-off. The PPGSL operates by first simulating a powerful surrogate attacker conducting sensitive link attacks on a given graph. It then trains a parameterized graph to defend against the simulated adversarial attacks while maintaining the favorable utility of the original graph. To learn the parameters of both parts of the PPGSL, we introduce a secure iterative training protocol. It can enhance privacy preservation and ensure stable convergence during the training process, as supported by the theoretical proof. Additionally, we incorporate multiple acceleration techniques to improve the efficiency of the PPGSL in handling large-scale graphs. The experimental results confirm that the PPGSL achieves state-of-the-art privacy--utility trade-off performance and effectively thwarts various sensitive link inference attacks.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2507_21139
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Learning-based Privacy-Preserving Graph Publishing Against Sensitive Link Inference Attacks
Wu, Yucheng
Yang, Yuncong
Han, Xiao
Wang, Leye
Wu, Junjie
Cryptography and Security
Publishing graph data is widely desired to enable a variety of structural analyses and downstream tasks. However, it also potentially poses severe privacy leakage, as attackers may leverage the released graph data to launch attacks and precisely infer private information such as the existence of hidden sensitive links in the graph. Prior studies on privacy-preserving graph data publishing relied on heuristic graph modification strategies and it is difficult to determine the graph with the optimal privacy--utility trade-off for publishing. In contrast, we propose the first privacy-preserving graph structure learning framework against sensitive link inference attacks, named PPGSL, which can automatically learn a graph with the optimal privacy--utility trade-off. The PPGSL operates by first simulating a powerful surrogate attacker conducting sensitive link attacks on a given graph. It then trains a parameterized graph to defend against the simulated adversarial attacks while maintaining the favorable utility of the original graph. To learn the parameters of both parts of the PPGSL, we introduce a secure iterative training protocol. It can enhance privacy preservation and ensure stable convergence during the training process, as supported by the theoretical proof. Additionally, we incorporate multiple acceleration techniques to improve the efficiency of the PPGSL in handling large-scale graphs. The experimental results confirm that the PPGSL achieves state-of-the-art privacy--utility trade-off performance and effectively thwarts various sensitive link inference attacks.
title Learning-based Privacy-Preserving Graph Publishing Against Sensitive Link Inference Attacks
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.21139